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ABSTRACT 
 
The Regional Distribution of Public Employment:  
Theory and Evidence 
 
We analyze the optimal regional pattern of public employment in an information-constrained 
second-best redistribution policy showing that regionally differentiated public employment can 
serve as an expenditure side tagging device, bypassing or relaxing the equity-efficiency 
trade-off. The optimal pattern exhibits higher levels of public employment in low productivity 
regions and is more pronounced the higher is the degree of regional inequality within the 
country. Empirically, using a panel of European regions from 1995-2007, we find evidence 
that public employment is systematically higher in low productivity regions. The latter effect is 
stronger in countries with higher levels of regional inequality. 
 
 
JEL Classification: H11, J45, R12 
  
Keywords: public employment, redistribution, regional inequality, European regions 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Sebastian G. Kessing 
University of Siegen 
Department of Economics 
Höderlinstrasse 3 
57076 Siegen 
Germany  
E-mail: kessing@vwl.wiwi.uni-siegen.de
1 Introduction
Governments can regionally differentiate their policies along several dimensions. One
important dimension is the regional differentiation of public employment, which can give
rise to a critical equity-efficiency tradeoff. Alesina et al. (2001) document the regional
differences in public employment for the case of Italy. They also show that these differences
generate substantial redistributive effects, also pointing out the associated efficiency costs.
The latter can either be due to an inter-regionally inefficient allocation of publicly provided
goods and services, or to the detrimental effects a bloated public sector may have on
productive efficiency. Such findings raise the question whether public employment is an
appropriate instrument of a redistributive policy and, in particular, whether it is possible
to characterize the equity-efficiency tradeoff inherent in regionally differentiated public
employment.
The potential role of public employment for efficient redistribution has been addressed
originally by Wilson (1982). He uses a framework of optimal linear taxation and studies
whether the public sector should alter the composition of its workforce in favor of high
or low-skilled individuals. As he shows, the optimal policy involves a distortion of the
public workforce composition, but its direction depends crucially on whether human cap-
ital formation is endogenous or not. Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), Boadway and Keen
(1993), Pirttila¨ and Tuomala (2005), Lundholm and Wijkander (2008), Blumkin et al.
(2009), and Blomquist et al. (2010), among others, have subsequently analyzed how the
government’s expenditure decisions, its employment choices, and its regulatory interven-
tions in the labor market can improve the efficiency of the tax-transfer system. None of
these contributions, however, considers the regional policy dimension, which is the focus
of our analysis.1
In this paper we develop a coherent optimal taxation framework to study the equity-
efficiency tradeoff inherent in the regional differentiation of public employment. The aim is
to explore whether this differentiation can be a sensible element of an incentive-compatible
redistribution policy. Our analysis shows that a regionally differentiated employment
policy can be used as an expenditure side tagging device helping the government to
implement an incentive-compatible redistribution scheme. Akerlof (1978) was the first to
point out that the correlation of earnings ability with certain personal characteristics (such
1There is also a political economy and bureaucracy literature, where public employment is seen as an
instrument for politicians to channel rents to specific groups either to generate political support (Gelb
et al. (1991), Lo´pez-de-Silanes et al. (1989)), to disguise the amount of transfers channelled to some
favored minority group (Alesina et al. (2000)), or to create commitment within a bureaucracy (Kessing
and Konrad (2008)). The regional dimension of public employment in a political economy framework
has recently been discussed by Jaimovich and Rud (2009). The latter contribution can be regarded as
complementary to our approach.
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as race, gender, the region of residence, etc.) can be exploited to improve the efficiency
of tax-transfer schemes. However, for reasons of horizontal equity, or of practical and
political feasibility, such tags are typically not applied in real world tax systems (see
Boadway and Pestieau (2006)). This is also true for the regional dimension, since income
taxes set by central governments are typically not differentiated by region.
We argue that public employment can be an expenditure side substitute that also
allows the tagging of low productivity individuals, and we identify several channels how
regionally differentiated public employment may improve efficiency. First, public employ-
ment generates goods and services which are consumed locally. Higher public employment
in low productivity regions thus generates a direct targeted consumption effect, without
violating incentive compatibility. This channel works identically for regionally differenti-
ated government spending. Second, because public sector productivity tends to be less
regionally dispersed than private sector productivity, the opportunity costs of moving a
worker from the private to the public sector tends to be lower in low productivity regions.
Finally, a regional differentiation of public employment eases incentive compatibility, if
regional private sector wages depend on regional public employment. These latter two
channels do not typically arise with regionally differentiated public spending.
We then assess empirically the regional pattern of public employment in Europe using
a rich panel data set including 220 NUTS 2 regions from 17 European countries over the
period 1995-2007. The data on public employment have been directly provided by Euro-
stat and have the advantage that they exclude information on sectors such as education,
research and health care, where the amount of workers with a private employer is relevant.
In our analysis we go beyond individual country-level approaches and explicitly consider
a cross-country dimension. Our aim is to detect regularities in the regional patterns of
public employment across countries and to explore the possibility that such patterns are
systematically correlated with the degree of regional inequality within each country. Our
findings indicate that public employment is significantly higher in low productivity regions
and that this relationship is more pronounced in countries with higher degrees of regional
inequality. These results are robust to different specifications and are in line with our
theoretical analysis of an inherent equity-efficiency trade-off of regionally differentiated
public employment.
Existing empirical cross-country studies on the determinants of public employment,
such as Rodrik (2000), and Mart´ınez-Va´zquez and Ming-Hung (2009), only consider data
at country level, so they do not provide any evidence regarding the regional distribution
of public employment. At country level, instead, a few studies have already considered
the regional dimension of public employment. Jaimovich and Rud (2009), for example,
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analyze the regional evolution of public employment from a political economy perspective,
with a focus on Argentina. Alesina et al. (2001) study the regional public employment
in Italy, whereas Borge and Matsen (2004) consider the role of public employment for
risk sharing at regional level for the case of Norway. Finally, Alesina et al. (2000) and
Mattos and Franc¸a (2010) focus on public employment at the municipal level in the US
and Brazil, respectively, although they do not explicitly take the regional dimension into
account.
The paper is organized as follows. We set up our basic theoretical framework in
Section 2, which is divided into three parts. We first investigate the consumption channel
of regionally differentiated public employment; we then consider in more detail the labor
market effects; finally, we discuss several extensions of our theoretical framework. Section
3 presents our empirical analysis: we describe the dataset we use, we introduce our baseline
empirical specification and we present our results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 A baseline model
We consider an optimal direct taxation model, similar to Stiglitz (1982). There are
two regions i = 1, 2, each with their respective population normalized to one, and two
types of individuals j = h, l. The types differ in their productivity such that we have
wh > wl, where wh is the wage of high productivity individuals and wl is the wage of low
productivity individuals. The share of individuals of type j in region i is mij. Region 2 has
a higher productivity on average than region 1, so that 1 ≥ m2h > m1h ≥ 0. As usual in
the optimal taxation approach, we assume that all individuals have the same preferences,
which, similar to Diamond (1998), are given by a simple quasi-linear specification
Uij = xij − h(lij) + v (gi) , (1)
with derivatives h′(l) > 0, h′′(l) >, v′ (g) > 0, v′′ (g) < 0, where xij is private good
consumption, lij is individual labor supply and gi is a public good, which can only be con-
sumed locally. We interpret the latter as public employment, implicitly assuming a public
sector with a linear technology which relates public goods and public employment, as in
the private sector.2 In the following we introduce public employment explicitly to identify
2Alternatively, the regionally provided goods gi could be produced privately and could only be pur-
chased by the public sector. Such an interpretation implicates that the analysis of this section not
only relates to public employment but also applies to the regional distribution of public spending more
generally.
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further channels which determine the optimal regional pattern of public employment. The
prices of private and public goods are normalized to one.
Society is inequality averse. As in Blumkin et al. (2009), we first employ a CES-type
social welfare function
W =
∑
i=1,2
∑
j=h,l
mij
Uρij
ρ
, with 0 6= ρ < 1. (2)
The government implements a tax system that defines tax or subsidy payments Ti =
Ti (wili) as a function of gross income only, since it cannot observe individual productivity
directly. While the government may differentiate public employment by region, we assume
that it cannot condition the tax system on the region of residence. This may be due to
political or monitoring constraints. The tax payments determine individual net income
and thus private consumption, xi = wili− T (wili). Since the government cannot directly
observe individuals’ productivity and conditions taxes on gross income, the tax system
needs to be incentive compatible. We only consider downward incentive compatibility,
i.e. high income earners should not have an incentive to mimic low income workers. The
incentive compatibility constraint is
xh − h (lh) ≥ xl − h
(
lˆ
)
, (3)
where the hat on a variable indicates a high productivity individual mimicking a low
productivity individual, such that lˆ = wl
wh
ll. Note that public employment does not enter
into the incentive compatibility constraint since both types of workers consume the public
goods provided in their region. Finally, taxes not only serve to redistribute between
high and low income workers but also finance public employment in both regions.3 To
facilitate comparative statics, we assume an exogenous average level of public employment
equal to g and assume that g1 = (1 + a) g and g2 = (1− a) g, so that the parameter
a ∈ [−1, 1] summarizes regional differentiation of public employment. The government’s
budget constraint is thus
(m1h +m2h) (whlh − xh) + (m1l +m2l) (wlll − xl) ≥ 2g. (4)
The government maximizes (2) subject to (3) and (4). Solving (3) and (4) for x1 and
x2, and substituting into (2), it maximizes (2) by choosing ll, lh, and a.
4 The first order
3In practice, regional and local governments often play a key role in the determination of regional
public employment. We abstract from them for simplicity and discuss their potential role along with
other extensions in Section 2.3.
4See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A1.
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condition with respect to a is
[
m1lU
ρ−1
1l +m1hU
ρ−1
1h
]
v′ (g1) =
[
m2lU
ρ−1
2l +m2hU
ρ−1
2h
]
v′ (g2) . (5)
The optimal solution thus requires v′ (g∗1) < v
′ (g∗2) and therefore g
∗
1 > g
∗
2 and a
∗ > 0,
where the asterisks indicate optimal values. We summarize this in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If regions differ according to their average productivity and the govern-
ment cannot observe individual productivity directly, the solution to the social welfare
maximization problem entails a∗ > 0. Optimal public employment should be higher in the
region with lower average productivity.
Intuitively, since the locally consumed public goods provided through public employ-
ment do not enter the incentive compatibility constraint (3), they can be used for redis-
tribution. The optimum trades off the welfare gains from redistribution with the costs of
distorted public goods supply.
We now turn to the role of regional inequality for regional differentiation of public
employment. This leads us to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 An increase in productivity differences across regions, keeping the total
share of high and low productivity individuals constant, increases the optimal degree of
regional differentiation of public employment.
Proof. See Appendix.
If regional productivity differences are more pronounced, the optimal policy requires a
stronger differentiation of public employment. Intuitively, with more regional inequality,
public employment becomes a better targeted instrument in the context of an optimal
redistribution policy.
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 are valid regardless of whether the regional differ-
entiation refers to public employment or to public spending, since local consumption is
driving the results. We now consider more in detail additional aspects of regionally dif-
ferentiated public employment, which are typically not present in the case of regionally
differentiated public spending.
2.2 Endogenous wages and public sector production
Alesina et al. (2001) stress the double role of public employment. According to this
perspective, there are not only distributional effects originating from the consumption of
regionally differentiated levels of public goods and services, but there are also important
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effects on regional labor markets. These originate from the substantial role played by
public sector labor demand, which can drive up regional private sector wages. This makes
wages endogenous. Additionally, the optimal regional public employment policy should
also take into account the specific structure of public sector production which typically
exhibits lower variation in productivity levels relative to the private sector. In order to
study how these effects relate to the optimal regional distribution of public employment,
we now drop the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between the regional level of
public good supply and the regional level of public employment. Moreover, we depart
from the assumption of exogenous wages. In particular, we now model employment and
production in the public sector explicitly and allow for endogenous wages. To keep the
analysis tractable, we only consider the case of perfect correlation between individual
productivity and the place of residence, by setting m1l = m2h = 1 and m1h = m2l = 0.
Accordingly, we drop the subscripts h and l, and we now employ a Utilitarian welfare
function
W =
∑
i=1,2
u (xi)− h(li) + v (gi) , (6)
with utility being strictly concave in private consumption, u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) < 0. This
objective function closes down the consumption channel of regionally differentiated public
employment studied in Section 2.1.5
Individuals in both regions either work in the private or in the public sector. We
denote the fraction of individuals in the public sector of each region by ni, such that
1 − ni work in the private sector. Private good production qi is determined by regional
production conditions summarized by a production function fi(.), f
′
i (.) > 0, f
′′
i (.) < 0,
while total labor input in the private sector is given as the share of private sector workers
times their individual labor supply
qi = fi (li (1− ni)) . (7)
Note that this implies the existence of pure profits in both regions. As in related studies,
such as Blackorby and Brett (2004), these are assumed to be fully taxed by the govern-
ment. The publicly provided good gi is locally produced by the public sector according
to the simple linear relationship
gi = nili. (8)
5Using the objective function (6) in Section 2.1 would not result in differentiated public employment
in the optimum. An encompassing formulation includes this objective function and a higher relative
welfare weight for low productivity individuals.
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Note that (8) implies that labor is equally productive in the public sector in both regions.
We regard this as a useful benchmark illustrating the fact that regional productivity
dispersion is typically smaller in the public sector relative to the private sector. We discuss
the implications of alternative assumptions about public sector production in Section
2.3. Note also that our qualitative results do not depend on this specific production
function. However, this form makes the interaction between the public and the private
sector particularly simple, since private production can be expressed as qi = fi (li − gi).
Differences in personal productivity in the private sector are now only due to the
location of workers and do not originate from some innate differences between individuals.
Region 2 is the more productive region, which we capture by the assumption of a higher
marginal labor productivity there. Assuming labor is paid its marginal product in the
private sector, the productivity difference between regions can be stated as
w2 = f
′
2 (l2 − g2) > f ′1 (l1 − g1) = w1. (9)
We assume that the public and the private sector pay the same wage in each region,
and there is no migration between the two regions. The additional implications of public
sector wage premia and migration are discussed in Section 2.3 below. We define the
inter-regional wage ratio as
z ≡ w1
w2
=
f ′1 (l1 − g1)
f ′2 (l2 − g2)
. (10)
The wage ratio is increasing in the public good production in region 1 (zg1 > 0), but
decreasing in public good production in region 2 (zg2 < 0).
The government’s problem is now to choose x1, x2, l1, l2, a to maximize (6) subject to
the incentive compatibility constraint
u (x2)− h(l2) ≥ u (x1)− h(zl1) (11)
and subject to the aggregate resource constraint
x1 + x2 ≤ f1 (l1 − g1) + f2 (l2 − g2) . (12)
This latter condition requires that total private consumption cannot exceed total pri-
vate production and is equivalent to the government budget constraint. The first order
condition with respect to a is
v′ (g2)− v′ (g1) = λl1h′(lˆ) [zg1 − zg2 ] + µ [f ′2 (l2 − g2)− f ′1 (l1 − g1)] , (13)
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where λ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints (11) and
(12), respectively. This directly leads to Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 With endogenous wages the optimal policy requires public employment
and public goods production to be higher in the region with lower average productivity:
n∗1 > n
∗
2, g
∗
1 > g
∗
2, and a
∗ > 0.
Proof. Both terms on the right hand side of (13) are positive since f ′2 (l2 − g2) >
f ′1 (l1 − g1) and zg1− zg2 > 0 given that zg1 > 0 and zg2 < 0. This implies v′ (g∗2) > v′ (g∗1),
and thus g∗1 > g
∗
2 and, by (8), n1l1 > n2l2, which implies n
∗
1 > n
∗
2, since l
∗
1 < l
∗
2.
Thus, even without tagging via regionally differentiated consumption levels of public
goods and services, the optimal policy requires public employment to be higher in the
low productivity region. There are two additional reasons for this regional differentiation.
First, there is a difference in opportunity costs. While productivity in the public sector
is the same in both regions, moving a worker from the private to the public sector is
more costly in the high productivity region. This is evident from the second term on the
right hand side of (13), which is the regional difference in marginal productivity in the
private sector, valued at the society’s shadow value of additional private goods. The sec-
ond effect is less obvious and directly relates to the role a regionally differentiated public
employment policy can play for efficient redistribution. It is embodied in the first term
on the right hand side of (13), λuˆ2l [zg1 − zg2 ]. This effect is also positive and thus drives
the optimal marginal utilities from public good consumption in the two regions further
apart. Increasing public employment in the low productivity region and decreasing it
in the high productivity region both reduce the wage differential between regions, thus
relaxing incentive compatibility. The effect of public employment on wages makes it less
attractive for high income earners to mimic low income workers. Thus, regionally dif-
ferentiated public employment relaxes incentive compatibility. This relates to the results
of Naito (1999), Blackorby and Brett (2004), and Gaube (2005), who have also shown
that endogenous wages can provide a rationale for distorting production to improve an
information-constrained redistribution policy.
2.3 Extensions
Our theoretical approach has taken the simplest route to highlight the channels that
can provide a normative rationale for regionally differentiated public employment. Such
policies can apparently be useful as expenditure side tagging devices that can improve the
targeting of redistribution policies via the consumption side of public goods and services.
Moreover, they can exploit regionally different opportunity costs of public employment.
9
Finally, they mitigate the incentive compatibility constraint inherent in redistribution
under asymmetric information. Our framework has abstracted from a number of aspects
that are potentially relevant in practice which we - as much as possible - take into account
in our empirical analysis in Section 3. We consider the theoretical implications of these
additional aspects one by one.
Public sector wage premia. Public sector wage premia would generate several
additional effects. First, they would introduce an additional inefficiency into production.
Second, they would increases the utility of public sector workers. Third, they could put
upward pressure on private sector wages by themselves, as private firms may be forced
to increase wages to keep their workers. Overall, they should reduce the level of public
employment, but their effect on the regional distribution is not evident.
Regional differences in unemployment. Regional unemployment differences would
also modify our analysis. On the one hand, moving workers out of unemployment into
public employment has lower opportunity costs than moving a worker from the private to
the public sector. On the other hand, with slack in the labor market, the positive effect on
private sector wages and the resulting effects on incentive compatibility are dampened,
thus weakening the channel that identifies regionally differentiated public employment
policies as an element of an efficient incentive-compatible redistribution policy.
Heterogenous goods. The presence of heterogenous goods would have the following
implications. If the regional private sectors produce different goods (such as, for exam-
ple, agricultural and industrial products), diverging price developments for the respective
goods may be driving regional inequality. However, also in this case, the argument for
regional tagging via public employment remains valid, since, for a government concerned
about redistribution, it does not matter whether regional wage differences originate from
diverging prices or from other underlying structural differences.
Regional and local governments. Additional government tiers were not included in
the analysis but play an important role for public employment in practice. However, they
typically depend strongly on financing from the central government. Thus, the regionally
differentiated policy of the central government also includes the distribution of grants: in
this way, the central government has more policy options to regionally differentiate its
policy. However, the lower level governments typically only have the discretion to decide
whether to spend their revenue directly, or whether to use it for public employment.
As a consequence, the omission of lower level governments does not pose a fundamental
challenge to our analysis and their inclusion would not change our argument qualitatively.
Of course, an encompassing approach that takes the sub-national government-levels into
account would additionally have to consider their incentives, which would substantially
10
complicate the analysis.6
Migration. By assumption, migration between regions is not possible in our frame-
work. However, our model could easily be extended to allow for it. As long as there are
migration costs, allowing for migration between the two regions of our model would not
change our results qualitatively, although a lower degree of optimal regional differentiation
in public employment would result.
More general production technologies. Differences in labor intensity could not
show up in our simple framework, since we did not allow for other factors of production
apart from labor. As it is clear from the work of Naito (1999), a more general production
function with an additional production factor could be set up. In such a framework,
regional differentiation of both public employment and labor intensity would arise at the
same time. Similarly, even with only a single factor of production, we could have used a
less specific production function for public sector production in Section 2.2. Clearly, with
regional productivity dispersion also in the public sector, the opportunity cost argument
in favor of regionally differentiated public employment is reduced, although it remains
relevant as long as regional public sector productivity is more compressed than private
sector productivity. The consumption channel, and the incentive compatibility channel,
however, remain unaffected by an increase in the public sector’s regional productivity
differential.
Positive analysis. In line with the optimal taxation tradition we have used a norma-
tive framework to analyze whether there is a rationale for using regionally differentiated
public employment from a benevolent policy maker’s perspective. Of course, with a view
to our subsequent discussion on the empirical evidence we show, the argument of an inher-
ent equity-efficiency trade-off could be extended to a positive analysis, where individuals’
welfare feeds back into the political success of politicians.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
To empirically investigate the link between regional public employment per capita and
regional productivity in Europe, we assemble a dataset with regional data at NUTS2 level
for 17 European countries.7 All regional data are taken from Eurostat regional statistics
6The role of government decentralization in terms of public employment is the focus of the recent
paper by Mart´ınez-Va´zquez and Ming-Hung (2009).
7The countries in our sample are: Austria Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Slovak Republic, United
Kingdom. Our largest sample includes 243 NUTS2 regions, while the sample under investigation includes
11
and range from 1995 to 2007. For all details about data and sources, see the Appendix.
Our measure of public employment is the number of people employed in the NACE
sector ”Public administration and defence; compulsory social security”. Accordingly, the
measure excludes information on public employment in sectors such as education, research
and health care. This level of data disaggregation is not publicly available and has been
kindly provided by the Eurostat staff. 8 While this somewhat narrow definition of public
employment may appear as a limitation, it actually has the advantage of excluding workers
of those sectors where private firms and non-profit organizations are relevant, and where
there are substantial differences in their relevance depending on the country and region.
Indeed, since the LFS only classifies workers by sector and not by employer, publicly
employed workers in sectors such as health, education and others cannot be distinguished
from privately employed ones, thus implying that the actual amount of public employment
at regional level cannot be retrieved. In other words, using workers from NACE sector
”Public administration and defence; compulsory social security” guarantees us that the
measure of regional public employment we adopt is largely representative only of workers
with a public employer. Moreover, since our focus is the regional distribution of public
employment from a cross-country perspective and not the overall size of the public sector,
a narrower but consistent measure of public employment is more useful than a broader
measure with regional and/or cross-country inconsistencies. As far as productivity is
concerned, the measure we adopt is regional wages and salaries per number of employed
persons in manufacturing and is taken from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics.
Preliminary evidence of the link between regional public employment per capita and
regional productivity is presented in Figure 1. The figure shows two maps of 243 Eu-
ropean regions classified according to their regional productivity per worker (left) and
regional public employment per capita (right) with respect to their country average in
2007. To calculate the country averages, each regional measure has been weighted by
the population share of the corresponding region. For clarity, regions have been grouped
into four categories according to their relative position with respect to their country av-
erage: <80%, 80-100%, 100-120% and >120%. The maps show that in Europe there is a
substantial dispersion of both regional relative productivity and regional relative public
employment. In addition, in some countries there is clear evidence of a correspondence
between a relatively low level of productivity and a relatively high level of public employ-
ment with respect to the country average (e.g. Italy and Germany). This evidence closely
relates to the scatter-plots presented in Figure 2, which show the correlation between
220 regions. As it will be clarified below, the sample we consider excludes the capital regions and a
number of outliers.
8See the Appendix for details.
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Figure 2: Relative regional productivity and relative regional public employment per
capita in the six biggest European countries, 2007.
regional relative productivity and regional relative public employment per capita in the
six biggest European countries in terms of population in 2007. A negative relationship
between regional productivity and regional public employment appears to be visible for
most of the countries, while not for all of them (e.g. France).
The figure also illustrates the unambiguously high level of relative public employment
per capita in the capital regions of our sample (e.g. Lazio and Ile de France) and in some
other regions (e.g. Ceuta y Melilla). In line with the above evidence, in the empirical
analysis we perform, we focus on the relationship between regional public employment and
regional productivity by excluding from the initial sample the regions which are evident
outliers. First of all, we exclude the capital regions. Indeed, all capital regions are natural
outliers since public employment is substantially higher there due to the specific tasks that
are carried out at the seat of government. In addition, we take out a number of regions
whose peculiar level of public employment is due to historical or geographical reasons.
We then end up with a sample composed of 220 European regions.9
9From the initial sample of 243 regions we first take out all the 17 capital regions, i.e. the regions
where the capital is located. The only exception is The Netherlands, where we exclude South Holland
instead of North Holland since we take into consideration that The Hague and not Amsterdam is the
administrative capital of the country. In addition, we eliminate Ceuta-y-Melilla in Spain and Northern
Ireland in Ireland since their level of public employment per capita is abnormally high (see Figure 2),
14
Table 1: Summary statistics.
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Public employment p.c. 2655 0.030 0.008 0.008 0.061
Productivity 2291 0.023 0.010 0.001 0.050
Inequality 2398 0.136 0.040 0.014 0.257
Population density 2402 0.251 0.426 0.003 3.656
Dependency ratio 2662 0.505 0.048 0.374 0.627
Relative compensation 2373 1.134 0.277 0.841 2.192
Unemployment rate 2663 0.089 0.052 0.012 0.334
NOTE: The sample under consideration include 220 European NUTS2 regions.
From the available sample of 243 regions we exclude the following outliers: all the
capital regions, Northern Ireland, Ceuta y Melilla, Canarias, Madeira, Ac¸ores and
Valle d’Aosta. For explanations see the text.
The summary statistics of the sample under consideration are presented in Table 1.
In our sample, according to our narrow definition of public employment, on average 3%
of the population work in the public sector. The average dependency ratio is about 50%,
meaning that the group of people below 15 and over 64 years correspond to half of the
working age population (i.e. the population aged between 15 and 64). Moreover, the
average relative public to private compensation is 1.134, evidencing that our sample is
characterized by the presence of public sector wage premia. Finally, the average regional
unemployment rate is about 9%.
In the following, we investigate the relationship between regional public employment
and regional productivity more in details.
3.2 Empirical specification
Our theoretical framework implied that i) regions with lower productivity should have
higher levels of public employment and ii) the negative correlation between regional public
employment and regional productivity should be more pronounced in countries with higher
regional inequality. To investigate these issues, we adopt an empirical specification which
makes use of the nested structure of regions within the European countries. Our goal is to
study the actual regional pattern of public employment in Europe and to check whether
this pattern is in line with our normative conclusions. To this aim, in our analysis we
focus on the following three key variables: public employment per capita, productivity
and the degree of regional inequality. The reference empirical specification is
publemplikt = β0 + β1prodikt + β2ineqkt + β3prodiktineqkt + β4Zikt + zi + xt + εikt, (10)
due to the large presence of security personnel. We also take out the three Atlantic islands of the sample
(i.e. the Spanish region of Canarias and the Portuguese regions of Madeira and Ac¸ores) in line with the
standard practice of empirical studies on European regions. Finally, we eliminate Valle d’Aosta in Italy
because of its very high level of relative public employment per capita (see Figure 2) and since it is a
very small region with a special autonomous status.
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with i indicating region, k indicating country and t indicating time (year). The unit of
analysis is a region-country-year.
The dependent variable publemplikt is public employment per capita. The three main
variables of interest are: productivity (prodikt), inequality (ineqkt) and the interaction
term between productivity and inequality (prodiktineqkt). While productivity and public
employment per capita are measured at regional level, the degree of regional inequality
is evaluated at country level, and is measured by the coefficient of variation.10 The
cumulative effect of productivity on public employment per capita is then captured by β1
and β3ineqkt, and varies with the degree of regional inequality within the country. The
vector Zikt is a vector of additional control variables at regional level: among them we
include population density, to account for size effects, and its squared term, to account
for the possibility of a non-linear impact of it. A further regional-level control is the
dependency ratio, which is a traditional key control variable in the reference literature on
the determinants of public employment. To account for the potential role of public sector
wage premia and of regional unemployment differentials, we include as controls the ratio
of public on private compensation and the regional unemployment rate, together with its
squared term.11 Finally, the zi are time-invariant region-specific characteristics, xt are
time fixed effects and εikt is the error term.
3.3 Results
Table 2 presents the results of seven different empirical specifications which investigate the
link between regional productivity and public employment per capita. All specifications
are pooled OLS regressions with country and time fixed effects. The dependent variable
is regional public employment per capita. Column (1) includes only productivity, which
shows to be negative and strongly significant, in line with our theoretical framework and
with the evidence shown before. Column (2) adds inequality, showing that productivity
is negative and significant, and that inequality is insignificant. Our key regressor, i.e. the
interaction term between regional productivity and inequality, is included in column (3).
The results show that while productivity is insignificant, inequality is positive and strongly
significant and the interaction term is negative and strongly significant. These findings are
in line with the normative implications of our theoretical framework and show the key role
of the interaction between productivity and inequality for the regional public employment
distribution: the negative relationship between productivity and public employment is
more pronounced in countries with higher degrees of regional inequality. In addition,
10For further details about the calculation of our inequality measure, see the Appendix.
11For lack of relevant data at regional level, relative public to private compensation is measured only
at country level. See the Appendix for details.
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Table 2: The link between regional public employment and regional productivity. Ordi-
nary least squares estimations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Productivity -0.407*** -0.401*** 0.004 0.125 0.163 0.248 0.257
[0.087] [0.090] [0.154] [0.166] [0.158] [0.160] [0.160]
Inequality 0.006 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.065***
[0.011] [0.021] [0.023] [0.022] [0.020] [0.020]
Productivity∗Inequality -2.787*** -3.240*** -3.009*** -2.959*** -2.984***
[0.772] [0.859] [0.825] [0.770] [0.769]
Dependency ratio 0.008 0.004 0.011 0.010
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011]
Population density -0.002* -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Population density2 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Relative compensation -0.019*** -0.019***
Relative compensation [0.003] [0.003]
Unemployment rate 0.026*** 0.050**
[0.010] [0.025]
Unemployment rate2 -0.097
[0.091]
Constant 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.038***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Observations 2284 2284 2284 2048 2048 1804 1804
R-squared (adjusted) 0.448 0.447 0.453 0.421 0.444 0.402 0.403
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of groups 220 220 220 218 218 201 201
NOTE: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at regional level. Regional public
employment per capita is the dependent variable.
country-level regional inequality goes along with higher public employment.
Column (4) adds to the specification of column (3) three key control variables: the
dependency ratio, population density and population density squared. The dependency
ratio is insignificant, while standard considerations suggest that it should be positive.
Indeed, higher dependency ratios are often associated to higher levels in the provision of
public goods such as public health and public education. In our findings the absence of a
positive effect could be explained by the fact that our measure of public employment does
not include employment in sectors such as health and education. Population density is
negative and significant, while its squared term is positive and significant. This suggests
the existence of a non-linear effect of population density on public employment. In other
words, while for regions which are not highly populated the effect of population density is
negative, for highly populated regions this effect is positive, suggesting that regional size
(in terms of population density) matters for regional public employment distribution.12
Column (5) of Table 2 includes public to private relative compensation, which is negative
and significant, as expected: a higher public wage premium reduces public employment.
Column (6) adds to the previous regressors the regional unemployment rate. The results
12The point of inflexion corresponds to a level of population density equal to 2000 inhabitants per
square kilometer.
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Table 3: The link between regional public employment and regional productivity. Panel
data estimations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES FE FE FE FE FE FE FE RE
Productivity -0.141 -0.099 0.136 0.031 0.051 0.053 0.041 0.049
[0.092] [0.093] [0.099] [0.094] [0.095] [0.099] [0.097] [0.083]
Inequality 0.009 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.046***
[0.006] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010]
Productivity∗Inequality -1.896*** -0.958** -1.040** -1.568*** -1.541*** -1.913***
[0.456] [0.421] [0.425] [0.426] [0.423] [0.397]
Dependency ratio -0.080*** -0.079*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.042***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.009]
Population density 0.007 -0.033 -0.032 -0.040 -0.014***
[0.016] [0.038] [0.043] [0.043] [0.003]
Population density2 0.008 0.010 0.011* 0.004***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.001]
Relative compensation -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Unemployment rate -0.012 -0.042** -0.025
[0.009] [0.017] [0.016]
Unemployment rate2 0.113* 0.072
[0.068] [0.065]
Constant 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.027*** 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.075***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.008] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.006]
Observations 2284 2284 2284 2048 2048 1804 1804 1804
R-squared (within) 0.0832 0.0846 0.0950 0.158 0.159 0.212 0.215 -
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effects - - - - - - - Yes
Number of groups 220 220 220 218 218 201 201 201
NOTE: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at regional level. Regional public
employment per capita is the dependent variable.
show that, ceteris paribus, regions with higher unemployment rates also have higher levels
of public employment. Finally, column (7) adds the squared unemployment rate and
represents our full specification: while the squared unemployment rate is insignificant, all
the other variables behave as shown before. Most important, in our full specification the
interaction term between productivity and inequality maintains its sign and significance
level, as it happens in all the preceding specifications.13
In Table 3 we illustrate the results of two panel data methods which include the
presence of region-specific time invariant effects. Columns (1) to (7) apply the fixed effects
specification to the regressions of Table 2. As the results illustrate, all our main variables
of interest (i.e. productivity, inequality and the interaction terms between productivity
and inequality) have the same effects as before: our main findings are hence robust to
the inclusion of region-specific fixed effects. As far as the additional control variables
are concerned, they almost entirely replicate the results of the ordinary least squares
13It is important to note that in a set of regressions equivalent to those in columns (3) to (7) but where
both inequality and the interaction term between inequality and productivity are not considered, regional
productivity is always negative and significant, as it is in columns (1) and (2). Although in line with our
intuition, we prefer to present only the results of the encompassing specifications to reveal the key role
of the interaction between regional productivity and inequality at country level. Note additionally that
productivity is negative and significant also in panel estimations analogous to those presented in Table 3
but where inequality and the interaction term are not present.
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regressions. The only exceptions are the dependency ratio, which shows to be consistently
negative and significant, and population density, which is now insignificant. The reason
why the dependency ratio has a negative sign may be related to the fact that in the
fixed effects specification there are some cyclical effects that are not picked up by time
effects.14 Population density is no more significant since most of its effect is now picked
up by regional fixed effects, being a variable that hardly changes over time. The last
column of Table 3 illustrates the findings of a random effects specification. The reference
set of regressors is that of the full specification in column (7). As the results show, all our
key variables maintain the same sign and significance levels they had before. Moreover,
the fixed effects approach proves to be superior to random effects through the Hausman
test.15
To sum up, both, the ordinary least squares specifications results and the panel specifi-
cations results, are in line with our normative theoretical perspective. Public employment
per capita is higher in regions with lower productivity, and this effect is more pronounced
in countries with a higher degree of regional inequality.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a first step in the analysis of the regional distribution of
public employment. We have developed a normative theoretical framework which inte-
grates regionally differentiated public employment into an optimal taxation framework.
In our model the optimal pattern of public employment exhibits higher levels of public
employment in low productivity regions; at the same time, the negative link between
public employment and productivity is more pronounced in countries with higher levels
of regional inequality. Our results show that the regional differentiation of public em-
ployment can serve as an expenditure side tagging device to improve the efficiency of
tax-transfer schemes. It allows better targeting of low productivity individuals via local
consumption of public goods, via the exploitation of regional differences in opportunity
costs, and through a beneficial effect on incentive compatibility of the tax-transfer system.
These findings may provide an alternative perspective on regional public sector pro-
ductivity. Alesina et al. (2001) find substantial productivity differences in the public
sector across Italian regions which are mainly caused by the high levels of public employ-
ment in Southern Italy. Our theoretical analysis illustrates that such regional productivity
14For example, the dependency ratio could pick up the effects of migration on regional working age
(and total) population, which are in turn related to regional economic performance.
15The Hausman test gets a significant p-value of 0.000, indicating that the preferred model is fixed
effects versus the alternative random effects.
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differences may not necessarily be taken as an indicator of public sector inefficiency by it-
self, but could, at least partly, be interpreted as a by-product of an efficient redistribution
policy.
In order to provide empirical evidence on the actual regional pattern of public employ-
ment, we have then analyzed empirically the regional distribution of public employment
in Europe. Using a novel panel dataset of European regions from 17 countries, we find ev-
idence that the regional distribution of public employment is actually consistent with our
normative analysis. Public employment is significantly higher in low productivity regions
and this relationship is significantly stronger in countries with a higher degree of regional
inequality. These findings are robust to a number of different empirical specifications.
For completeness, we would like to stress that we have only partially discussed alter-
native policy instruments which, from an encompassing perspective, could prove superior
as expenditure side tagging devices. We have shown that regionally differentiated public
spending has similar effects, but that regionally differentiating public employment can
have additional merits rooted in differences in opportunity costs or in its effects on in-
centive compatibility. On the other hand, intervening in the labor market may cause
additional negative side effects, which are outside the scope of our theoretical framework
but must be considered in an encompassing policy assessment.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The welfare maximization problem is
max
{xi,li,a}i=1,2
W =
∑
i=1,2
mij
Uρij
ρ
s.t. (A1)
whlh − xh + wlll − xl ≥ 2g and xh − h (lh) ≥ xl − h
(
lˆ
)
(A2)
with m2h = m1l =
(
1
2 + ∆
)
and m1h = m2l =
(
1
2 −∆
)
, 0 < ∆ < 12 . Solving the two constraints
for xl and xh and inserting into (A1) leaves us with three choice variables ll, lh, and a. This
gives the three first order conditions
ll : 0 =
(
1
2
+ ∆
)wl + zh′
(
lˆ
)
2
− h′(ll)
Uρ−11l (A3)
+
(
1
2
−∆
)[
1
2
(
wl + zh
′
(
lˆ
))
− h′(ll)
]
Uρ−12l
+
(
1
2
−∆
)wl − zh′
(
lˆ
)
2
Uρ−11h + (12 + ∆
)wl − zh′
(
lˆ
)
2
Uρ−12h ≡ Φl
20
lh : 0 =
[ (
1
2 + ∆
)
Uρ−11l +
(
1
2 −∆
)
Uρ−12l
+
(
1
2 −∆
)
Uρ−11h +
(
1
2 + ∆
)
Uρ−12h
]
wh − h′ (lh)
2
≡ Φh (A4)
a : 0 = v′(g1)
[(
1
2
+ ∆
)
Uρ−11l +
(
1
2
−∆
)
Uρ−11h
]
(A5)
− v′(g2)
[(
1
2
−∆
)
Uρ−12l +
(
1
2
+ ∆
)
Uρ−12h
]
≡ Φa
The first order conditions define the three endogenous variables l∗1, l∗2, and a∗. We are in-
terested in the sign of ∂a
∗
∂∆ . Linearizing the system of (A3), (A4), and (A5) using the partial
derivatives of Φrs, r = l, h, a, and s = l, h, a,∆, the comparative statics can be calculated as
∂a∗
∂∆
= −
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h
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l
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h
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a
lh
Φaa
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, (A6)
where the zero entries in the matrix in the numerator follow from wh = h
′ (lh) which follows
from (A4). Due to the second order condition we have
sign
(
∂a∗
∂∆
)
= sign
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Φll 0 Φ
l
∆
0 Φhh 0
Φal 0 Φ
a
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (A7)
Signing Φll,Φ
h
h,Φ
a
∆,Φ
a
l , and Φ
l
∆we find Φ
l
l < 0,Φ
h
h < 0,Φ
l
∆ > 0,Φ
a
∆ > 0, and Φ
a
l > 0. Evaluating
the determinant ∣∣∣∣∣∣
Φll 0 Φ
l
∆
0 Φhh 0
Φal 0 Φ
a
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = ΦllΦhhΦa∆ − Φal ΦhhΦl∆ > 0, (A8)
and thus
∂a∗
∂∆
> 0  (A9)
A.2 Data description and sources
All data at regional level are from Eurostat regional statistics. Public employment data have
been kindly provided by the Eurostat staff. All remaining regional data can be found on the
Eurostat website. Additional data at country level are from OECD. Details follow.
Public employment p.c.: Public employment per capita. Public employment is the num-
ber of people employed in the NACE sector ”Public administration and defence; compulsory
social security” (sector L, NACE rev. 1.1). Source: Eurostat (Regional Labour Force Statistics-
LFS ). Period: 1995-2007. Geographical aggregation level: NUTS 2. Public employment per
capita is the ratio between public employment and population.
Productivity: Wages and salaries per number of person employed in the NACE sector
”Manufacturing”. Source: Eurostat (Regional structural business statistics). Period: 1995-
2007. Geographical aggregation level: NUTS 2. Units of measure: Millions of euro.
Inequality: Coefficient of variation of regional productivity. The measure has been calcu-
lated for each country. Each regional productivity has been weighted by the population share
of the corresponding region. Source: authors’ calculation from Eurostat data on productivity
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(see above). Period: 1995-2007. Geographical aggregation level: NUTS 0 (country level).
Population density: Total population per square kilometers. Source: Eurostat (Regional
demographic statistics). Period: 1995-2007. Geographical aggregation level: NUTS 2. Unit of
measure: Thousands.
Dependency ratio: Ratio of persons who are below 14 and above 64 years over the working
age population (i.e. the persons who are aged between 15 and 64 years). Source: Eurostat
(Regional demographic statistics). Period: 1995-2007. Geographical aggregation level: NUTS
2.
Relative compensation: Ratio of public to private compensation per capita. Public com-
pensation is compensation of persons engaged (total employment) in the NACE sector ”Public
administration and defence; compulsory social security”. Private compensation is compensa-
tion of people engaged in the NACE sector ”Manufacturing”. Source: OECD (STAN). Period:
1995-2007. Geographical aggregation level: NUTS 0 (country level). Per capita public (private)
compensation has been derived as the ratio between public (private) compensation and public
(private) employment, taken from OECD (STAN).
Unemployment rate: Unemployment rate. Source: Eurostat (Regional Labour Force
Statistics-LFS ). Period: 1995-2007. Geographical aggregation level: NUTS 2.
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